

THE *Nation*

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 153

NEW YORK · SATURDAY · AUGUST 2, 1941

NUMBER 5

IN THIS ISSUE

THE SHAPE OF THINGS

EDITORIALS

The Abasement of Vichy *by Freda Kirchwey*

Nazifying Our Law

ARTICLES

A Test of Mr. Roosevelt *by I. F. Stone*

Squeeze Japan Now! *by Nathaniel Peffer*

Hague on the Run *by Will Chasan*

Taxes and Consumption *by Charles E. Noyes*

Witch-Hunt in Georgia *by Jonathan Daniels*

In the Wind

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

Notes by the Way *by Margaret Marshall*

"... the Poison They Name" *by Mina Curtiss*

From the Anglo-Saxon *by Rolfe Humphries*

Refugees into Citizens *by Franz Hoellering*

Music *by B. H. Haggin*

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

Editor and Publisher

FREDA KIRCHWEY

Managing Editor
ROBERT BENDINER

Washington Editor
I. F. STONE

Literary Editor
MARGARET MARSHALL

Associate Editors

KEITH HUTCHISON MAXWELL S. STEWART

Dramatic Critic

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

Business Manager and Director of Circulation

HUGO VAN ARX

Advertising Manager

MARY HOWARD ELLISON

The Shape of Things

81

IN THE FEW DAYS SINCE THE LAST *NATION* appeared, a new turn in world events has modified the policy and perspectives of the United States. Japan is moving an army of occupation into French Indo-China, and the President has announced economic reprisals against Japan. The order freezing Japanese assets in the United States, supported by parallel action in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Dutch East Indies, was a direct answer to Tokyo's move, and it followed by one day a formal statement by Acting Secretary of State Welles denouncing Japan's aggression in the South Pacific as a threat to American interests and possessions. The full consequences of the freezing order have not yet been revealed; it is only known that from now on Japan will presumably have fewer dollars to spend on oil even if the government permits its sale. And the President's supplementary order bringing the armed forces of the Philippines under United States command are a sign that we may mean business. Perhaps by the time this issue is read the courageous example of the Dutch East Indies in canceling its trade agreement and embargoing oil sales to Japan will have been followed by the United States.

★

100

WE HOPE SO. WE HOPE THE PATIENCE OF the Administration, which has seemed almost inexhaustible since the invasion of China in 1937, has at last run out. We warmly support the urgent recommendations of Nathaniel Peffer, appearing on another page of this issue, that a complete boycott on trade with Japan—a policy of absolute non-intercourse—be substituted for the appeasement of the last four years. But we are inclined to wait for events to demonstrate the reality and extent of the new policy. We have too often heard thunderous pronouncements that are looked upon in high places as safe and satisfactory substitutes for action. And in the case of Japan we have good reasons for suspending judgment. On the very day Mr. Welles issued his statement denouncing Japanese aggression, the President made an impromptu speech in which he said that "if we had cut off oil they, the Japanese, probably

would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago and you would have had a war." By the same reasoning if we cut off oil today they probably will go down to the Dutch Indies tomorrow—especially since by their present aggression they have taken a long step in that direction—and then "you will have war" even more certainly than a year ago. That, at least, seems the logic of the President's argument. And it suggests the possibility that the beginning of economic warfare may not mean the ending of appeasement. Until we hear an official announcement that not one more barrel of oil will be allowed to go to Japan from the United States we shall sit back and wait—hopefully but with our fingers crossed.

★

THE BATTLE OF SMOLENSK, ACCORDING TO the latest German reports, is drawing to "a successful conclusion," but such claims have ceased to be impressive. It is now nearly two weeks since the capture of this key city and a decisive break-through on the road to Moscow were first announced in Berlin. Since then the German High Command has daily reported progress without being able to present any evidence as to its nature. At the same time Nazi news agencies, "official spokesmen," and "soldier-reporters" have been busy concocting alibis. We hear much of rain, mud, and bad roads handicapping the mechanized forces. There are admissions that the Soviet guerrillas are proving a serious menace to communications, and Berlin is commenting bitterly on "unfair" Russian tactics. A few weeks ago we were told by the Nazis that Red soldiers were being driven unwillingly into battle and were surrendering in droves; now these same sources tell us that the Russians are fighting with fanatical bravery. The general picture is still vague and incomplete, but the quality of Russian resistance has evidently surprised the Germans, as, indeed, it has surprised most of the rest of the world.

★

GERMANY NEEDS A DECISIVE VICTORY IN Russia during the next few weeks for political as well as military reasons. Only such a success could induce Japan to provide the kind of diversion in the Far East, whether by attacking Siberia or the East Indies, for which the Nazis are looking. Again, the least indications of a German setback cause stirrings in the occupied countries and magnify the effects of the heightened propaganda campaigns being carried on by both Britain and Russia. Even Germans are not immune from uneasiness as the Gestapo paper, *Das Schwarze Korps*, testifies by attacking "stupid Germans" who "dare to ask why Hitler suddenly discovered that Stalin and Molotov are criminals." If it becomes certain that Germany must face both a winter campaign in Russia and intensified British bombing, a sharp deterioration in domestic morale is inevitable.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT SEEMS TO HAVE WON his fight to prevent the demobilization of the still only half-trained men of the new army by adroitly shifting the issue from the question whether or not the son of a Congressman's constituent should stay in camp to the question whether or not a national emergency exists. Especially since the new Japanese development even the isolationists are finding it difficult to deny that the United States may conceivably be affected by a war that has already spread over half the world's surface, and the final passage of the service-extension resolution seems assured. Senator Robert R. Reynolds was the only one of ten members of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate to vote against reporting the resolution. Reynolds, who has made no bones about his admiration for Hitler's efficient methods, says that our national interest is not imperiled "unless we continue the policy of challenging certain nations of the world to conflict." "Great fear has been instilled into the minds of the American people," he went on, by "false propaganda," and he cited as examples such films as "Mortal Storm" and "The Great Dictator." Obviously, in the view of Robert Reassuring Reynolds, the tales of Nazi brutality that have poured out of Europe since the escape of the first refugee are also "false propaganda"; and any resemblance we may see between ourselves and the people living or dead, in these accounts is purely coincidental.

★

THE NATION HAS MORE THAN ONCE PRINTED stories describing the system of forced labor on the new trans-Saharan railway now being built under Nazi supervision to serve as a military link between French North Africa and Dakar. Thousands of Spanish republicans have been shipped to the construction camps in the Sahara along with many ex-legionaries—men of various nationalities who volunteered for the defense of France against the Nazi invasion. An article by Heinz Pol in *The Nation* for May 3 discussed in detail the hideous working conditions and disciplinary measures endured by this slave labor. In answer to a query by the *New York Times* the Governor General of Algiers has denied *The Nation's* charges, dismissing our reports as "absolutely inexact." We do not question the motives of the *Times* in inviting an answer from this Vichy official, but its value is obviously just as great as would be the comment of Heinrich Himmler on stories of cruelties inflicted in German concentration camps. We have seen many documents—several in the form of desperate appeals for help from prisoners themselves—reiterating every charge made in *The Nation*. And in the face of mere official denials we believe them. But even the statement of the Algerian governor bears out our main charge—that thousands of innocent men have been sent to Africa against their will to work under military discipline at a grueling task. This is slavery, no matter what the Vichy officials may call it.

IN REPO
it is estim
of revenue
pressed th
fully in
national
this score
its three
bill possi
in income
will no d
pay them
prices con
the bill i
the urgen
a balance
page 91,
keep total
of goods
achieve t
drastically
to curtail
ence leve
gory than
higher ta
effects of
leaves the
50 per ce
the direc
culated to

IN VIEW
of contro
the Feder
public se
tions bet
the inquir
Act of
licenses o
conveni
occasion
lation, "I
the applic
stations a
wants to
and broad
distort th
of news
between
tions." E
inquiry a
and new
\$200,000
Robb, ed
to testify

IN REPORTING THE NEW TAX BILL WHICH, it is estimated, will bring in an additional \$3½ billion of revenue, the House Ways and Means Committee expressed the belief that "this burden will be borne cheerfully in the light of the overwhelming importance of national defense." We believe the committee is right on this score, but we are much less certain that the result of its three months' deliberations is the most satisfactory bill possible under the circumstances. The sharp increases in income tax imposed on the lower and middle brackets will no doubt appear to be severe to those called upon to pay them. But they will seem even more of a load if prices continue to rise. And one of our chief criticisms of the bill is that it does not take sufficiently into account the urgent necessity of using the tax system to maintain a balanced economy. As Charles E. Noyes points out on page 91, it is essential, if inflation is to be avoided, to keep total spendable income in line with the total volume of goods and services available for consumption. To achieve this end, spendable income must be cut more drastically than it is by the present bill. It is not possible to curtail the spending of those at or below the subsistence level—and far more of our people are in this category than comfortable editorial writers like to admit. Still higher taxation of the very rich may be possible, but its effects on total consumption would be negligible. This leaves the middle-bracket families, who account for some 50 per cent of the total national spending power. Neither the direct nor the indirect levies in the new bill are calculated to cut sufficiently the expenditure of this group.

★

IN VIEW OF THE GROWING CONCENTRATION of control of the means of disseminating information, the Federal Communications Commission is rendering a public service in beginning an investigation of the relations between the press and the radio. The authority for the inquiry rests on a provision of the Communications Act of 1934 directing the commission to grant radio licenses only after a determination that "public interest, convenience, or necessity" would be served thereby. The occasion is the inauguration of the new frequency-modulation, "FM," radio broadcasting. More than a third of the applications now pending for FM licenses come from stations affiliated with newspapers, and the commission wants to know "whether joint association of newspapers and broadcast stations tends or may tend to restrict or distort the broadcasting of news, or to limit the source of news to the public, or to affect adversely the relation between news-gathering services and broadcasting stations." Elisha Hanson, for the publishers, has attacked the inquiry as an interference with the freedom of the press, and newspaper owners of radio stations have raised a \$200,000 war chest to fight the investigation. Arthur Robb, editor of *Editor and Publisher*, has already refused to testify "on advice of counsel."

THE REAL INTERFERENCE WITH FREEDOM of the press and radio comes not from the commission but from the growing monopoly in both revealed by the expert testimony at the first hearings. Of 1,426 cities with daily newspapers, there is a local press monopoly in 1,245. The depression years that followed 1929 intensified the trend toward monopoly, and since an unsuccessful attempt by the press to fight the radio in 1932 and 1933 there has been a growing tendency toward the interlocking of newspapers and local radio stations. The publishers, finding themselves unable to block news and advertising competition from the radio, decided to try to take it over. In 1933 only 9.5 per cent of all radio stations were affiliated with newspapers. In 1941 the ratio is 33.2 per cent. Newspaper-affiliated stations in 1940 sold 35.3 per cent of all radio time and owned 37.5 per cent of all tangible property devoted exclusively to broadcast services. The hearings are expected to show a close connection between newspaper wire services like the Associated Press and the various radio news services. Little can be done to halt the wiping out of independent papers, but the government should refuse radio licenses to newspaper interests in cases where such control would result in a local information monopoly. The maintenance of competition between press and radio is one way to preserve greater freedom in the spread of news and ideas.

★

GOVERNOR TALMADGE'S LATEST EXPLOIT IN driving two "furriners" out of the state university system of Georgia on charges of having tried to establish racial equality in the schools is described in all its Hitleresque detail on another page. It is only the most recent of a series of actions by which the terrible Talmadge has seized virtually absolute control of the state government. In the last session of the legislature he obtained the passage of a bill authorizing him to handle all state funds; he also maneuvered a resolution extending the governor's term to four years and specifically extending his own present term. Talmadge had packed the Board of Regents which dismissed the professors. He already has control of the secondary-school system. Needless to say, the issue of racial equality is a "white herring" designed to appeal to the backwoods vote. Atlanta's two daily newspapers, the *Constitution* and the *Journal*, have denounced his actions and his motives, and even some papers which have supported him are now in opposition or refuse to defend him. For his part, Talmadge has threatened to shut off the supply of government news from the leading Atlanta papers unless they "change their attitude." Talmadge, like O'Daniel of Texas and the other little Southern dictators since Huey Long, casts a shadow no bigger than Goebbels's hand; but he reminds us again that the South will continue to sprout demagogues until its economic health is established.

The Abasement of Vichy

BY FRED KIRCHWEY

THE Japanese occupation of Indo-China will have some diverse and useful by-products. It will undoubtedly help inform doubting Americans of the interlocking nature of the world struggle and will hurry several important defense measures toward enactment. It has already ended the long, and ultimately futile, effort to buy peace in the Pacific by selling Japan the tools of war. It has also exposed beyond further concealment the status of Vichy and has demonstrated again the dangerous absurdity of treating Hitler's French functionaries as if they were the heads of a government.

The abasement of Vichy is complete. Further acts of subservience can reveal no new depths. And the elaborate pretense of independent action in regard to Indo-China only serves to dramatize and add a note of cynical humiliation to the surrender. The Pétain government invites the government of Japan to help it defend the integrity of Indo-China and protect the colony from the expected aggressions of unnamed aggressors. Japan generously agrees. Indeed, its warships and convoys are on the way to Saigon before the Vichy request is even framed. Thus the political and moral regeneration of France asserts itself; thus Vichy defends the inviolability of the French Empire.

Translated, the formula sounds a little different. Hitler has decided that the time for a diversion in the Pacific has come. If Japan dare not attack Siberia, it can at least threaten the British position at Hongkong and Singapore, the American at Manila, and the war supplies of both powers in the Dutch Indies. By the same move it can gratify its own desire for expansion at a moment when a move in some direction has become an acute national necessity. So Hitler hands over the richest colonial possession of his western province, France, to his greedy eastern ally. And the puppet governors of the province of France provide the cynical camouflage required to satisfy Hitler's pathological delight in legal formulas.

But if Vichy acted under "duress," as Mr. Welles gently put it, what moral does that carry for the United States; what policy does it prescribe? Does it not prove again a fact that needed no further proof—namely, that since the French government does not exist in any real sense, attempts to purchase its favor or give it help are nothing more than attempts to appease Berlin?

If Vichy surrendered Indo-China under duress, on what theory could we continue to sell oil to the Vichy forces in North Africa? Do we have reason to think that they will "defend the empire" there by tactics different from those applied in the Far East? Let us turn to Syria for our answer. The forces of Marshal Pétain defended

the empire by fighting the British and Free French troops in Syria—which was not even a part of the empire but a mandated territory supposedly on the verge of independence. In the Far East they defend the empire by delivering Indo-China to the Japanese. But Syria was useful—and was being used—as a jumping-off place for Hitler's aviators; so it had to be fought for. And Indo-China is about to be used as a jumping-off place for Hitler's ally; so it had to be surrendered. The logic of these actions is as plain as the Nazi plans for world conquest, into which they fit like fragments of mosaic.

And the rest of the French African possessions will be made to fit in too, in exactly the same way, unless British and American force prevents it as British force prevented it in Syria. Already the German-controlled press of Paris is busy explaining the need of full military collaboration with Germany—Marcel Déat describes it charmingly as "the indispensable brotherhood in arms"—to assure protection of the French Empire in Africa. The agreement with Japan, it unanimously says, has pointed the way, and the threat of aggression by the United States against Dakar has proved the necessity of such "joint" measures of defense.

The question this country should ask itself is not the imbecile, self-answering question, Is Vichy independent? What this country should ask is the question, Is there still time to prevent the full utilization of French African possessions by Hitler?

Nazi technicians and officials are already established at all the important French bases from Oran to Dakar. In Casablanca Germans supervising the construction of the new harbor works occupy all the hotels. The town is closed by a tightly enforced curfew from six in the evening to six in the morning while the construction work is pushed under Nazi police direction. In many centers Germans have occupied the airdromes and refuse to permit access to them by the French themselves. Even where French officials are in ostensible control, they are forced to report to Gestapo agents who exercise final authority. But in spite of this rigid supervision Nazi armed forces are not yet entrenched in numbers anywhere in French Africa. Nor can Hitler move large bodies of troops into that region as long as Russian resistance holds 151 German divisions and many thousands of planes and tanks on a 2,000-mile front.

Hitler's press in Paris has indicated clearly enough what is going to happen as soon as Hitler's hands are freed. Vichy will find that Dakar and other key points are threatened by the United States, which, as the Paris newspapers point out—and their contention is backed up by such helpful American observers as Senator Wheeler and Mr. Lindbergh—is now assuming the role of "aggressor" in the eastern Atlantic. Vichy will beg its good neighbor, Germany, following the generous example of Japan, to assist it in defending these outposts

of empire then be met

Vichy in disguise the disgrubbing era of ap his whole must be an end to in Vichy bare that ence of

Until in the P in the fa lies, the ended. V struggle with the Nazi-Vi planes a material eastern counter- should be the chic against

N
W

will ag "concer in 193 House been re

"Thi man Sa commit with es What tion an counsel measur perman legislat

The marize ranking submit it was

of empire. And the British and the United States will then be faced with an accomplished fact which cannot be met effectively by any measures "short of war."

Vichy is a little worse than Berlin, because it is Berlin in disguise. The State Department has been dealing with the disguise, placating it, honoring its representatives, snubbing its opponents. The President has said that the era of appeasement is past. He has said that Hitler and his whole program of world conquest and domination must be resisted and will be resisted. But he has not put an end to the appeasement of Hitler's disguised agents in Vichy—even though the covering has worn so threadbare that the State Department acknowledges the existence of "duress."

Until the President takes military measures, not alone in the Pacific, where today's accomplished fact stares us in the face, but in the Atlantic, where the real menace lies, the policy of appeasing Hitler will not have been ended. While Russia holds Germany locked in furious struggle, Britain and the United States should combine with the De Gaulle forces in a vigorous drive against the Nazi-Vichy bases in North and West Africa. American planes and tanks are already arriving in Egypt. More material aid to the British and Free French troops in the eastern Mediterranean may turn their resistance into a counter-offensive. And at the same time prompt action should be undertaken with American naval help to secure the chief bases in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic against Nazi control.

Nazifying Our Law

WE HOPE that the labor movement, fresh from its victory in defeating the May strike-breaking bill, will again muster its forces to block passage of the Hobbs "concentration-camp" bill. This measure, first introduced in 1939 before the war broke out, was passed in the House but failed of enactment in the Senate. It has now been reintroduced.

"This is not a national-defense measure," Congressman Sam Hobbs of Alabama told a House judiciary subcommittee on April 18 of this year. "It has nothing to do with espionage, sabotage, kidnaping, or any other crime. What we are talking about is the policy of our immigration and deportation service." When Alexander Holtzoff, counsel to the FBI, who helped frame the present measure, was asked whether the bill was intended as permanent legislation, he answered, "This is permanent legislation."

The character of this legislation was eloquently summarized by Congressman Emanuel Celler of New York, ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee. He submitted a minority report in opposition to the bill when it was first reported out, in which he said:

This bill would, if enacted into law, introduce into the American system of jurisprudence the anomaly of providing prison terms which in some cases might amount to life imprisonment for persons who, through no fault of their own, are unable to obtain travel documents to foreign countries. It contemplates the creation of detention camps in this country release from which becomes dependent entirely upon the whim of an administrative officer, since the bill provides no legislative standards for administration. It sets up a procedure for the arrest and in some cases permanent detention of persons in a way which contravenes well-established principles of the United States Constitution. . . . Such provision for concentration camps or stockades should only be invoked when gravest danger threatens the sovereignty of the United States.

The Hobbs bill represents another step in the campaign since the last war to make America as unpleasant a place as possible for aliens, to discourage immigration, and to use limitations on the rights of aliens as an entering wedge for restriction of the rights of citizens. It is significant that one of the principal witnesses in favor of the "concentration-camp" bill was Captain John B. Trevor of the American Coalition of Patriotic, Civic, and Fraternal Societies, who spent most of two days on the stand and objected only that the bill did not go far enough. The Coalition brings together under one organizational roof some of the most reactionary associations in the country, with a plentiful sprinkling of fascists and anti-Semites. Trevor, with a long record as an alien-baiter, boasts that he was responsible for the adoption of the quota system, and it was he who appeared for the Coalition in 1935 to protest against the plans of the German Jewish Children's Aid to bring 250 child victims of the Hitler terror to this country. "The time has come to put America on guard," Trevor wrote in a letter opposing admission of these children.

When the provision for detention in concentration camps is coupled with such recent loosely drawn legislation as the state "model" anti-sabotage law, its possibilities for union-busting and strike-breaking are obvious. Fundamental is the need to maintain the basic rights of all classes of people in this country, alien or citizen, for if we become accustomed to the arbitrary and the despotic in dealing with one, we make it easier to apply the same methods to another. The Constitution itself makes no distinction between alien and citizen in its provisions for jury trial, double jeopardy, due process, habeas corpus, and similar safeguards. It is only in recent years that protection of the alien has been weakened by court decisions ruling that deportation was a "civil" and not a criminal process and therefore not hedged about with the same constitutional restrictions. The "concentration-camp" bill would take another long step away from the ideas of the founders of the Republic toward the ideas of the founder of the Third Reich.

A Test of Mr. Roosevelt

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, July 27

THE quarrel over curtailment of automobile production is more than a feud between Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Henderson. It will decide whether the productive machinery of this country is to be mobilized for its defense, or whether defense is to continue to be operated by, and for the benefit of, a little clique of big businesses. The decision is in the hands of Mr. Roosevelt, and the action he takes will disclose whether he has the mettle to prepare this country adequately for total war.

Total war appears often in the speeches, but rarely in the calculations, of the men running our defense program. When the New Dealers asked expansion of steel capacity, the big-business crowd argued that it would be better to cut civilian consumption. The same men who opposed the production of more steel now block adequate curtailment of steel consumption by the automobile industry. They want to wage war without disturbing the monopoly in steel or the boom in automobiles. This can only be done by fighting the war as a part-time job.

Mr. Henderson's order for a 50 per cent cut applies not only to automobiles but to mechanical refrigerators and electric washing machines. These three are among our largest consumers of the raw materials needed for defense. It is on automobiles alone that Mr. Knudsen has joined battle with Mr. Henderson. On paper, Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Hillman are the directing heads of the OPM. In actuality, defense production is managed by a triumvirate made up of Mr. Knudsen, Mr. Stettinius, and Mr. Biggers. Mr. Stettinius is in charge of priorities, Mr. Biggers of production. This is not a trio from which the automobile industry need fear harsh treatment. Mr. Knudsen is from General Motors, Mr. Stettinius from U. S. Steel, Mr. Biggers from the Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company. The automobile industry is one of steel's best customers. Libbey-Owens-Ford depends in large part on sales to the automobile industry. Mr. Knudsen helped Mr. Stettinius in the fight against steel expansion; Mr. Stettinius helps Mr. Knudsen oppose adequate curtailment of automobile production.

If General Motors prefers to concentrate on civilian business, the least it can do is to stop hoarding defense orders and let some of them go to smaller business men who need them badly. A compilation issued yesterday by an OPM stepchild, the Bureau of Research and Statistics (statistics can be embarrassing), indicates that defense is being operated on the monopolistic principles common to the businesses from which most of the dollar-a-year men

come. Six favored companies have a third of the total dollar volume of war orders. These, in the order of their backlogs, are Bethlehem Steel, New York Shipbuilding, General Motors, Curtiss-Wright, Newport News Shipbuilding, and E. I. du Pont de Nemours, which controls General Motors.

The compilation was as of the end of May. At that time General Motors had \$490,000,000 in defense contracts. Mr. Sloan's report for the second quarter of this year reveals that at the end of June "the aggregate of defense orders assigned to General Motors or under negotiation" amounted to \$1,200,000,000. Yet in the second quarter General Motors turned out but \$75,200,000 of defense work, less than 11 per cent of the total sales for that quarter. Only 14.4 per cent of its workers were engaged on defense orders, and the bulk of these orders was for ordinary trucks and cars for the army. Defense has been subordinated to the production boom because there is more profit for General Motors in civilian business. It has been averaging 25 per cent a year on its net worth. It cannot make that much on defense.

When a delegation of automobile workers went to Mr. Henderson earlier this week to protest that a 50 per cent cut in automobile production would deprive a quarter-million workers of their jobs, he said to them, "This wouldn't have happened if we had adopted the Reuther plan last fall." General Motors has benefited doubly by the failure of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hillman to put up a real fight for the Reuther plan. By letting Mr. Knudsen bury the plan without a fair hearing or tryout, they put the automobile industry in a position to muster worker support against curtailment of civilian production. Had some such program as Reuther's been launched last fall, tools and dies would now be ready for a shift to defense production, and labor delegations would not be here in a strange alliance with the automobile manufacturers. The Administration, by appeasing the manufacturers, who will be with the New Deal only so long as the New Deal is with them, lost the support of its natural allies in automobile labor. This is the recurring pattern of appeasement, whether at home or abroad.

There is no easy way out for the President. A declaration of war will not solve the problem, as can be seen from Baruch's unsuccessful attempts to curtail automobile production in the last war. The companies will neither stop producing automobiles nor divert their facilities to defense unless they are forced to do so, and they will never be forced to do so as long as their own business associates

August

are at the
has an in

Althou
that auto
Walter

plant is b
engines, a

sections f
cut in au

necessity
fense pro

turn to c
planned

among th
haphazar

companie
as possib

still give
leave the

resumpti

THE
ma

to t

ness, not
taken adv

The ch

nified tha

dug for i

sign of th

and the U

deeper fo

By join

pean war

on and af

America

leaving th

Russia wa

China wa

are at the controls of the defense program. The President has an inescapable responsibility.

Although Mr. Sloan is anxious to give the impression that automobile factories can turn out only automobiles, Walter Reuther tells me that Chevrolet's Tonawanda plant is beginning to make Pratt and Whitney airplane engines, and Fisher Body is producing wing and fuselage sections for planes. Necessity will force the 50 per cent cut in automobile production sooner or later, but no necessity requires the shift of automobile plants to defense production. It is hoped that the manufacturers will turn to defense work of their own accord, and it is planned to circulate a "shopping list" of defense work among them. To keep the diversion of facilities on this haphazard basis is to court disappointment. The big companies will prefer to divert as little of their facilities as possible to defense work; a 50 per cent cut would still give them a respectable volume of business and leave their precious production lines ready for quick resumption of automobile manufacture as soon as the

war is over. They will prefer to confine their defense work as much as possible to the new plane, engine, and tank plants being financed for them by the government. If this course leaves workers jobless, their resentment can be turned against the New Deal.

The efficient operation of our economy for defense and the maintenance of morale in a large section of American labor demand the establishment of an automotive defense board with power to draft and pool the productive facilities of the industry for defense. Only so can its full resources of machines and man-power be mobilized, duplication of effort eliminated, and idleness avoided. This can be done in a democratic way, with full compensation for owners and representation for workers. It cannot be done so long as the OPM is a standing testimonial to what Mussolini means when he calls us a "pluto-democracy." The President never faced a graver test, for we cannot hope to conquer Hitler if we do not have the energy and will to conquer monopoly and business-as-usual.

Squeeze Japan Now!

BY NATHANIEL PEFFER

THE basic fact that must now govern every decision made by the anti-fascist countries with reference to the Far East is that Japan is leading from weakness, not from strength. That fact can and should be taken advantage of.

The change in the Tokyo Cabinet two weeks ago signified that Japan was threshing about in the hole it had dug for itself. The present threat to the south is another sign of the same thing. The next move for Great Britain and the United States is plainly indicated. Dig the hole deeper for Japan and squeeze in from all sides.

By joining the Axis Japan mounted the tiger of European war diplomacy. Then it found itself afraid to stay on and afraid to get off. The British would not collapse. America would not conveniently move into the Atlantic, leaving the Pacific free for Japanese adventuring. Soviet Russia was still too robust to be tackled with impunity. China was prostrate but clinging so tight that Japan could not get up and move freely about the continent. Japan sought belatedly to hedge by making the so-called non-aggression pact with Russia. And then Germany attacked Russia.

What then? It was too early to attack Russia and too late to conciliate Great Britain and the United States. The maximum price that Japan could offer was less than Great Britain and the United States would take. The least that they would take—since it had to do with China

—was more than Japan would give. In Europe as in Asia Japan had gone too far to retreat and not far enough to do any good. But it was too risky to go farther.

In chagrin it looked for a scapegoat, and the mouthing Matsuoka was jettisoned. That did little good, either. To cover its mortification and prove that it still was to be feared, Japan had to do something more. Hence its occupation of bases in southern Indo-China. That was relatively safe, since it did not menace Great Britain or the United States enough to invite retaliation with force. Moreover, it might be useful later, for it brought Japan one step nearer British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, and it was psychologically satisfying. But in the strategy of grandiose Japanese diplomacy, as a means of effectuating the so-called New Order in East Asia, it advanced Japan very little. Singapore still stands. So do the Philippines. Until at least the first is reduced, Japan is worse off than before. It is dangerously extended, and it has given both Great Britain and the United States an irrevocable challenge. Essentially Japan is still where it was before its latest adventure and has gained nothing material in return, either economic or military.

Here is an opportunity for Great Britain and America. The initiative now is theirs if they desire it. They should seize the offensive; for the first time they can do so with a minimum of risk.

Concretely: Japan should be put in chancery economi-

cally. Half measures are of little avail. Freezing of economic assets is not enough. All economic relations with Japan should be severed. Nothing should be bought from Japan, nothing sold to it. No loopholes should be left through which trade might slip by means of technical eva-



Foreign Minister Toyoda

sions of exchange control. There must be complete non-intercourse—joint Anglo-American economic blockade at first, with the weapon of naval blockade held in reserve. If Japan retaliates by confiscating American property and assets in Japan and China, then Japanese property in this country should be confiscated, dollar for dollar. Whether Japanese assets in this country are greater or less than American assets in Japan or China is beside the point. America can afford the loss, while Japan cannot. Americans in the Far East whose property is expropriated can be compensated by being allotted pro rata the proceeds of the sale of Japanese property here. Thus domestic political complications can be avoided. It is manifestly unfair for certain groups to be penalized by the execution of a policy held to be in the national interest. Furthermore, all imports from Japan should be shut off. Thus Japan's principal source of free exchange, the sale of raw silk to the United States, can be dried up.

At the same time air reinforcements should be sent to the Philippines, and sent ostentatiously. They already have been moving from Great Britain to Singapore. It must be made clear to the Japanese, beyond the possibility of doubt, that now both Great Britain and the United States mean business.

It is too late for official statements denouncing aggression. It is too late for verbal warnings from President Roosevelt or Sumner Welles or Winston Churchill. The Japanese will take protests, caveats, and denunciations as so much rhetoric—which, at the present juncture, they are. Nothing will deter the Japanese now except concrete material reprisals as a foretaste of sanctions by force. Nothing can now prevent the European conflict from spreading to Asia—and thereby involving America in two oceans—except terrorization of Japan by the levying of penalties in advance, as token of what else may come. Such a course may entail risk, but the risk is inherent in the situation. It cannot be eliminated; it can only be minimized. This can be done only by giving Japan pause

—by instilling fear or, rather, by accentuating the fears that already make it hesitate.

Until recently there may have been some reason for caution. Something was to be said for the argument that it was better not to deprive Japan of oil and thus give it an excuse for advancing on the Dutch East Indies. For that would have put America in a tragic dilemma. If we tried to stop Japan our energies would be diverted from the Atlantic and German victory would be made easier. If we did not, Japan would get an empire by default, and British communications in the East be severed. Britain of course would have been helpless, or all but helpless. Thus it may have been better to evade the necessity of choice; much of the loose talk of appeasement in Washington has been unwarranted and unfortunate.

All that was changed, however, by two events—the reinforcement of Singapore by the British and the German attack on Russia. British reinforcements, combined with the coordination of defense plans by British, Dutch, and American staff representatives in the Far East, have so strengthened the anti-Japanese position in the South China Sea as to make a Japanese sally at least a risky enterprise. The German attack on Russia has given Great Britain—and therefore America—a breathing space. Three months ago the deflection of America's product of armament from the Atlantic to the Pacific might have doomed Great Britain; England had to be fortified against an attack that appeared to be impending. It is now safe for at least as long as Russia can hold out. Therefore America has a margin of time in which it is a free agent. Until now Japan could blackmail both countries. Now Great Britain and America can blackmail Japan. Now Japan is on the horns of a dilemma.

What can Japan do in retaliation? Attack the Dutch East Indies and Singapore? Attack Russia through Siberia? The first it will do in any case whenever it thinks it is safe to do so, that is, if and when there is evidence that Great Britain is about to go down. That will not be affected by what America does now. If Japan is not moving on Java, Sumatra, and Singapore now, it is only because it is not certain that Great Britain will be defeated and America thereby immobilized in defense against Germany. Until Great Britain does fall, Japan's hesitation will be in direct ratio to its belief that Great Britain can come through. America could not have better insurance coverage than is provided by maintenance of the battle fleet in Hawaiian waters. In so far, then, as the attenuation of Germany's strength by the war in Russia enhances the chances of British survival—and American freedom of action—Japan's disposition to strike at Singapore and the Dutch East Indies is diminished, no matter what America does now. For always there is the possibility that while Japan is engaging Great Britain and perhaps America in the South China Sea,

Russia n
which c
gency it
or may
but if
America
can do
issues a

Will
then att
likely un
crushed,
matter v
because
Singapo
If Japan
Great B
tically h
cannot s
the Dut
Even if
many" a
not nec
With re
Russia v
cient f
campaign

Of al
German

T
ca
cr
of the I
in his
tax redu
a Dem
legislat
close to
of the I
Republ
enough

The
disastro
and im
Hague's
fight on
of the p

Russia may be able to withstand the German attack, in which case Japan would be doomed. Against that contingency it must husband its resources. In short, Japan may or may not attack Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, but if it does it will not be because of any reprisals America may make now. It will be because it thinks it can do so safely. It is less likely to think so if America issues a warning now in the form of concrete action.

Will Japan join Germany outright, in retaliation, and then attack Russia through Siberia? That is not very likely unless there is clearer evidence that Russia is being crushed, in which case Japan will move into Siberia no matter what America does. It will hesitate to do so only because a hostile Britain is strongly entrenched at the Singapore base and America is disposed to help Britain. If Japan should expend itself against Russia and then Great Britain should survive after all, Japan would practically have committed suicide. By the same reasoning it cannot stake everything on an attack upon Singapore and the Dutch East Indies until it is sure Russia is crushed. Even if Japan really were "driven into the arms of Germany" and did attack Russia through Siberia, that would not necessarily mean Russian defeat and German victory. With respect to Russia Japan has nuisance value at best. Russia will stand or fall west of the Urals. It has sufficient force in Siberia to withstand the Japanese until the campaign in western Russia is determined.

Of all this Japan has been fully conscious since the German invasion of Russia, if not before; hence its hesi-

tation and its unwillingness to risk more than a token occupation of bases in Indo-China. If it is kept in a state of hesitation, that is, if it does not go beyond Cam-Ranh Bay and make an outright attack on British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, no harm will have been done. Then it will stand or fall according as Germany wins or loses in Europe. If Germany loses, Japan can be dealt with as a side issue.

The first essential is to keep Japan inactive now; to keep it suspended between the horns of the dilemma on which it has hung itself. There is only one chance of doing this—by frightening Japan. And that can be done only by America, and only if America acts quickly. America must penalize Japan at once, cut it off from the American—and the British—market quickly and completely, and give it to understand that if it indulges in any more adventurings in the belief that it can bring them off cheaply it will have to face the combined might of Great Britain and America. Time is of the essence. Japan has given the pretext by occupying bases in Indo-China. America and Britain should now crack down. On any equation of risks in the Far East this is the lesser. There is only one defense in the Far East now. It is to take the offensive. For the first time since 1931 there is a practicable opportunity to stop Japan. We should seize it. A beginning has been made. It should be followed through. We should neither desist nor relax. And we must always be guided by the principle that whatever we do will be effective in proportion as it is done quickly.

Hague on the Run

BY WILL CHASAN

THEY are laying no bets on Frank Hague's political future in New Jersey. The Boss has just gone crashing to defeat and has abdicated as state leader of the Democratic Party after one of the bitterest fights in his career. The issue was a proposal for railroad tax reductions introduced by Governor Charles Edison, a Democrat, supported by the Republican-controlled legislature, and bitterly opposed by Hague. Hague came close to victory, but in a dramatic twenty-hour session of the legislature, during which party whips kept shaky Republican members in the cellar of the State House, enough votes were finally rallied to beat him.

The passage of the tax reductions is expected to have disastrous repercussions for the Hague machine. The first and immediate effect will be a great diminution of Hague's prestige. The Mayor of Jersey City made the fight one between himself, cast in the role of "defender of the peepul," and an unholy trinity of "boodle scena-

tors," railroad lobbyists, and the Governor. He posted billboards all over the state, circularized voters, and ran full-page advertisements in New Jersey papers. They all began, "Mayor Hague charges the railroad deal of \$121,000,000 of the people's money has been signed, sealed, and is now ready for delivery," and went on to accuse specific legislators of being in the railroad lobby's pay. The violence of Hague's attacks overshadowed the tax issue, and for most Jerseyites the question was simply whether the legislature would yield to the Boss or roll him in the dust. Now they feel, in Tony Galento's epic phrase, that the Boss "has dirty pants."

The effect of the tax reductions on Jersey City's precarious finances and hence on Hague patronage will be even more serious. Padded pay rolls and political graft, the fuel on which the Hague machine runs, have made Jersey City the most heavily taxed municipality in the country and at the same time have piled up an enormous

debt and brought it to the edge of bankruptcy. The new tax structure will cut the city's income an estimated \$1,500,000 a year and cause it to forfeit several million dollars in delinquent taxes, against which it has already borrowed. Jersey City's bonded indebtedness is now close to the statutory limit, and its tax rate is so high that droves of people have surrendered their real estate or moved their business to other cities. Under these circumstances further borrowing and further tax increases seem equally unfeasible. The only alternative is rigorous



Mayor Hague

economy through wholesale wage cuts or dismissals. Any such curtailment of patronage will inevitably cripple Hague's machine, perhaps irreparably. Some of Jersey's political leaders believe that even stringent economies cannot save Jersey City from bankruptcy and look forward to this contingency with great relish. A prominent Republican,

in a recent conversation with the writer, made no bones about the fact that he wanted "to see Jersey City put through the wringer." It is hardly likely that Hague could survive the city's financial collapse. His frantic opposition to reduced tax rates is therefore easy to understand, and the dimensions of his recent defeat are apparent. As a matter of fact, the tax revisions are quite reasonable. New Jersey railroad taxes were exorbitant, owing largely to Hague's unbridled desire for revenue to finance his political ambitions. One of Hague's first steps on becoming mayor in 1917 was to increase assessments on railroad properties from \$67,000,000 to \$160,000,000, and he has been boosting assessments and taxes ever since. The state's whole tax bill has been similarly handled. Some of these increases were undoubtedly justified, but in the end they became uneconomic and punitive. A report of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1937 revealed that tax accruals in New Jersey were \$9,902 per mile as compared with an average of \$1,475 for the United States. Another study shows that in the years 1932-38 the average annual tax for five New Jersey lines was greater than the average net operating income.

The new tax measures, drawn up by a four-man commission appointed by Governor Edison early this year, provide for payment in full of \$34,000,000 back taxes that have been in litigation since 1932, waive \$18,000,000 in interest and penalties (assessed at the

rate of 12 per cent a year), and set up a new tax structure based on the roads' ability to pay. According to members of the commission, the new system will penalize only those municipalities in which taxes have been unreasonably high. These include, of course, Jersey City and other towns in Hague's Hudson County domain, where about 80 per cent of taxable railroad property is concentrated. Hudson County as a whole will lose at least \$2,000,000 annually, possibly more. That may be taking enough mortar from between the bricks to topple the building.

Probably the most exciting phase of the tax fight came when Hague, as the line goes, snatched defeat out of the jaws of victory. On the afternoon of Saturday, July 19, forty-eight hours before the railroad measures came up, two influential Republican legislators admitted to the writer that they did not have the votes to pass them. And they expressed the belief that the proposals would not come to a vote until two weeks later, at which time they would be amended to meet some of Hague's criticism. At the last minute, however, Hague's attacks on Republican leaders became so libelous that any withdrawal would have appeared to be a confession of guilt, and the tax reductions were jammed through. Hague had overreached himself.

The New Jersey boss had other than economic reasons for opposing railroad-tax reductions. He saw the fight as a chance to rehabilitate his waning influence in state politics. The recent newspaper headlines heralding a "break" between Hague and Edison were misleading in that they implied a former alliance. Edison was never Hague's man. His nomination was dictated by Washington, and his election meant the end of Hague's control over state patronage. Without contemplating an anti-Hague crusade, Edison wanted to relegate him to the status of "another county leader." It was his strategy to undermine Hague's importance by strengthening Democratic organizations in other counties, notably Middlesex, Mercer, and Union. The Hudson County machine was given no additional state patronage, and Hague's advice on appointments outside his own precincts was not solicited.

This treatment kindled intense resentment; Hague at one time phoned Edison from Florida and for an hour cursed, blustered, and threatened "to ruin" the Governor unless his recommendations were obeyed. When there was no change in Edison's attitude, Hague sought to exploit popular feeling against the railroad lobby, which in New Jersey has an unsavory record, and drive Edison into a corner. His spectacular effort has now proved a boomerang. It is still too early to predict whether Hague's surrender of state leadership is the beginning of a limited retreat or of a rout, but Edison's active hostility and the ravages of the tax fight are carrying him closer to defeat than he has ever been before.

Taxes and Consumption

BY CHARLES E. NOYES

THE tax bill prepared by the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives is a stiff dose for the people of the United States to swallow. But although it takes a number of steps in the right direction, it is not a good bill, for the lawmakers have failed to grasp, or even to consider, the fundamental fiscal problems of a war economy.

The fault lies partly with the Administration, especially with the Treasury, although the original bill sponsored by Treasury officials was considerably better than the one now presented to Congress. For some reason which has not been clearly explained, the Treasury selected the arbitrary figure of \$3½ billion as the amount which should be raised by tax increases in the coming fiscal year. This amount, in addition to existing taxes, was supposed to raise about two-thirds of the money which the federal government would spend during the same period. The defense program has been so increased since the Treasury estimate was made that the proposed taxes are not likely to yield over half of what the government will spend, but there has been no proposal to raise more money by taxes.

In the coming year the national income of the United States should reach \$90 billion, perhaps more. Of this amount about \$20 billion will be spent for defense and aid to Britain, if the Office of Production Management succeeds in stepping up the program according to plan; about \$70 billion worth of goods and services, at current prices, will be available for civilian consumption and normal government services. But money income payments to individuals will be at least \$90 billion, and probably more. If the government takes only \$12 billion or \$13 billion in taxes, which is what the new tax bill should raise, the people will have a lot more money to spend, even after they have paid their state and local taxes, than there will be goods to buy. If they try to spend it, the inevitable result will be rising prices, so that they may find themselves buying \$70 billion worth of goods and services for \$80 billion or more. Then the total amount of money income payments to individuals will obviously rise even higher, and the cycle of inflation will be well under way.

The government hopes to reduce the amount of money people will spend by borrowing part of their income. But why? If the total amount of goods and services available for consumers is only \$70 billion, why should net money income payments to individuals be any more than that? The reasonable and sensible thing

for the government to do would be to take away all the rest of the money in taxes. The people would not be any worse off. They would still have the \$70 billion worth of goods and services—if that estimate turns out to be correct—which is all they can have anyway. The only difference would be that the potential lenders to the government would lose the claim on future national income which their purchases of government bonds would represent. It is hard to see why anyone should gain a claim on future national income as a result of the defense program. The sale of government bonds to individuals in a war economy comes very close to being a measure of the extent of war profiteering.

The only possible argument in favor of it is in line with the Keynes plan now being used in England: that repayment of what the government borrows, after the emergency is over, would provide purchasing power to cushion the shock of post-war readjustments. However, unless our taxes are brought up to the level of England's, the government could not pay back the money borrowed now except by further borrowing, which would merely mean post-war inflation. England is raising very nearly all it possibly can by taxation and still has to borrow; there is no such justification for current borrowing in the United States. Taxes considerably less drastic than England's should be sufficient to raise the \$20 billion which the United States government hopes to spend on defense next year.

The problem of taxes is not, of course, merely to raise enough money to pay for government expenditures. When government expenditures consume a substantial part of the total national income, the incidence of taxes plays a large part in determining the distribution of real income to individuals. In a war economy, when the amount of real income, other than munitions, is limited to such an extent that it becomes necessary to cut down civilian consumption, it is imperative that taxes should be levied in such a way as to cut consumption where it will cause the least hardship. The tax bill now under consideration does not do that.

People are only beginning to realize that national defense will actually require serious cuts in the available volume of consumers' goods. Leon Henderson said on July 14 that during the first months of 1941 American consumers bought 40 per cent more automobiles, 35 per cent more refrigerators, 20 per cent more vacuum cleaners, 20 per cent more radios, 50 per cent more electric stoves, and 50 per cent more furniture than in

the corresponding months of 1940, which was a very prosperous year. Taking into consideration both the differences in prices and the growth in population, the people of the United States have been better off in goods and services in the latter part of 1940 and the early part of 1941 than they were in 1929. This high level of consumption should be remembered when percentage cuts in the production of consumers' goods are discussed.

It is neither necessary nor desirable for the United States to sacrifice its standard of living to the extent that is necessary in England. On the basis of studies made some years ago by the Brookings Institution and the National Survey of Plant Product Capacity, and taking into account increased productivity since those surveys were made, a national income of \$120 billion should be easy to achieve within a year or a year and a half. If we were then using half of it for war, instead of the 17 per cent we are using now and the 20 to 22 per cent we may be using by the end of this calendar year, the volume of goods and services left for civilians would still be about the same as in 1935-36, when the national income was about \$60 billion.

In those years the pattern of spending on consumers' goods by family income groups, as revealed in a government study, looked like this:

SHARE OF EACH DIVISION OF NATION'S CONSUMER UNITS IN AGGREGATE DISBURSEMENTS, 1935-36

Major Items	Aggregate Disbursement (millions of dollars)	Percentage of Aggregate Spent by:			
		First Quarter (Over \$1,715)	Second Quarter (\$1,070 to \$1,715)	Third Quarter (\$635 to \$1,070)	Fourth Quarter (Under \$635)
Food	16,865 ..	40.1 ..	26.7 ..	20.5 ..	12.7 ..
Housing	9,506 ..	47.1 ..	24.3 ..	17.5 ..	11.1 ..
Household Operation ..	5,285 ..	50.5 ..	24.1 ..	16.4 ..	9.0 ..
Clothing	5,261 ..	53.5 ..	23.4 ..	15.4 ..	7.7 ..
Automobile	3,781 ..	65.2 ..	21.8 ..	9.6 ..	3.4 ..
All Consumption Items ..	50,214 ..	48.3 ..	24.8 ..	17.1 ..	9.8 ..

A companion study made at the same time revealed that the percentage of family income taken by taxes was almost exactly the same for families in each income group from \$500 up to \$10,000. Below \$500 the percentage taken by taxes was actually larger, and above \$10,000 it was also larger, but in between it was close to 18 per cent in every bracket (including state and local taxes, direct and indirect). Only families above \$2,500 paid income taxes at that time, but the weight of sales taxes, excise taxes, and property taxes paid directly or in the form of rent was correspondingly heavier in the lower brackets.

These figures provide the frame in which the picture of consumption and taxes in a war economy must be placed. They show beyond a doubt that if consumption has to be reduced, it is the consumption of families in the upper-quarter income group which must be cut, not only because they are best able to stand it, but because they do such a large part of the consuming. The contention made so often in conservative newspaper editorials that, to be

effective, cuts in consumption must be made by the lower-bracket families is exactly the opposite of the truth. If the consumption of families in the upper-quarter income group were reduced by one-half—merely to the level of the upper middle quarter—it would have nearly as much effect as if the poorer one-half of American families were to stop consuming entirely. In terms of a war economy it would actually have a greater effect, because the upper-quarter families are especially heavy consumers of automobiles and other durable goods which compete directly with defense production.

For families with incomes below \$2,000, overall taxes are probably heavy enough now. The consumption of durable goods by the poorer families should be reduced somewhat by excise taxes on specific items whose production competes with defense, and to some extent the proposed tax bill will accomplish that result. Heavier manufacturers' sales taxes on photographic equipment, radios and phonographs, rubber products, and electrical appliances, as contained in the new bill, are all to the good. Probably they should be even more drastic, and should at least include all household appliances made of metal. If families in the lower income groups are forced to spend more of their income on food during the next two or three years because other things are too expensive, the effect on both national health and national economy should be beneficial. But certainly it would not be beneficial to reduce their income below present levels.

Taxes on income above \$10,000, as proposed, are fairly heavy. Perhaps they could be increased somewhat in the brackets between \$10,000 and \$20,000, but that is a matter of general policy and money-raising; such an increase would not have any very important effect on consumption.

The crux of the whole problem of taxes and consumption lies in the families with incomes between \$2,000 and \$10,000. They number less than one-fourth of all American families, but they receive only a little less than half of all income payments, and they do only a little less than half of all consumer spending. If one-quarter of their incomes were taken in taxes, they would still have about one-third of the national money income. The increases in income-tax schedules in the proposed bill would reduce the present purchasing power of a childless married couple with an income of \$2,500 a year by only about 1 per cent. If the income is \$5,000, the increase in the tax would be only about \$200, or 4 per cent of gross income, and for an income of \$10,000 the tax would be increased from \$528 to \$1,166. While this seems like a heavy tax in comparison with what the American people are accustomed to pay, the increase would reduce the purchasing power of \$10,000 families by only about 7 per cent. And the proposed new excise taxes would amount to only about 1 per cent of the total national income. Even taking state and local taxes into

consideration, this tax bill is wholly inadequate to effect a serious reduction in purchasing power in the brackets where consumption is greatest.

There has been too much vague talk about the sacrifice necessary for national defense without any clear understanding of what such sacrifice really means. Primarily, it means that because the nation is producing more airplanes and tanks and guns it cannot produce as many automobiles and radios and gadgets. To some extent the munitions can come from an increase in the overall volume of production, and to that extent they involve no sacrifice at all. But to the extent that they do cut into normal pro-

duction of consumers' goods they involve a reduction in the standard of living now. In that sense they are being paid for now, and there is no possible way in which payment can be put off to the future. While the emergency exists, it would be quite possible to devise a tax law which would spread the sacrifice fairly without any real hardship for anyone. But if that is not done now, there is no practicable way in which it can be done later. Some of the people will have been made a lot richer, and others a lot poorer, just as they were by the last war, and it will be too late to do anything about it short of revolution.

Witch-Hunt in Georgia

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

THIS Eugene Talmadge of Georgia, who demagogues in Dixie now, is tough and loud but no fool. You can't understand him without understanding the poor rural counties of Georgia, which Talmadge as governor understands so well. He does not represent that Georgia which in Atlanta is beginning to appreciate decency to the Negro and the dignity of freedom for a university. He believes he can destroy the state university by shouting "nigger" and get into the United States Senate in the process. Maybe he's right. He knows Georgia better than I do. And now that Huey Long is six years dead, maybe Gene Talmadge deserves more attention in the United States.

He put on a show for the country voters of Georgia when on phony racial grounds he and his packed board of regents ran Dean Walter Cocking and Dr. Marvin S. Pittman out of the university system of Georgia. The hearing was a circus, designed as one and presented as one. The Governor of Georgia, crushing his cigar in a grim mouth under hard, bespectacled eyes, was listening for noisy whooping from rural Georgia. He didn't care in the least what *The Nation* and the Civil Liberties Union and the association of college professors thought. He directed his show for the people he counted as his audience and his constituents.

"Tell 'em about the niggers from Tuskegee visiting here in Georgia at Statesboro," he ordered his stooge on the Board of Regents, who was conducting the prosecution. "Hit the chair and holler," he advised him again when the audience seemed to be growing a little restive.

But the perfect detail came at the last, after the professors had been legally lynched, when the well-dressed W. L. (Chip) Robert got up and pulled out of his pocket a typewritten resolution thanking the Governor for what he had done. Robert is no poor red-neck from

the Tobacco Road. He is equally at home in the Piedmont Driving Club in Atlanta, the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, and the Cloud Club in New York. He was secretary of the Democratic National Committee until, as contractor-engineer-promoter, he was clearly overburdened with defense contracts. He has sent a whole staff to build our base in Bermuda. He has nice connections in national political and financial fields. He helped organize the Southern Governors' Conference, and his name is on its stationery still. He rose to thank Talmadge and, unintentionally perhaps, made the pattern clear. It is a pattern by now familiar, and it scares me, when I see it in Georgia, more than it does when I look back on it in Germany and see how it has grown.

For a lot of you Georgia is a long way off, and it is easy to dismiss this show or misunderstand it. After all, Talmadge seems just another crazy Southern Governor on the loose. Huey Long, Theodore Bilbo, E. H. Crump, and others have taught us to expect such antics. Sometimes they even seem funny at a distance. The trouble is that they are not very far distant.

"Old Gene" Talmadge has shouted "nigger" to his country supporters again. But the Negro is not an important party in this matter. Talmadge has kicked out the professors, which is sad for them but for the rest of Georgia, and for us beyond Georgia, is chiefly important in being symbolic. Here is a 100 per cent American use of the formula of phony race attack as a means of destroying the intellectual integrity of a state—which is a first step in destroying the freedom of everybody in the state. Add suave "Chip" Robert, the promoter and politician in business, and you have something to frighten a country. It would be terrifying if from the same Georgia there were not encouraging signs also. Not to be missed in this case are those people in Georgia—important

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Notes by the Way

P. G. WODEHOUSE, who has been, as he puts it, "the guest of the German government at a series of their justly popular internment camps" for the past year, has written an article about his "war with Germany" for the *Saturday Evening Post*.

On the lips of everybody today from Berlin to Vladivostok, from Peebles to Mattahamquehasset, Maine [he writes], there is a question. It is the question "Afterwards—what?" . . . It may be, of course, that these groups were discussing the future of Europe, but the probability is that they were referring to me. . . . In short, putting the thing in a nutshell, whither Wodehouse?"

He then canvasses, on this "humorous" level, the effects his war with Germany will have on Wodehouse the man, Wodehouse the Englishman, and Wodehouse the idol of society. The first section tells us that owing to his efforts to keep a stiff upper lip he has become so bright and sunny that the "*Lagerführer* now has to shade his eyes when he passes me on parade," and also warns us inimitably to be prepared for a bearded Wodehouse. The third celebrates German potatoes and beer, which, combined with the magnificent air of Upper Silesia and nine hours' sleep every night, presage the return of twice as much Wodehouse as we had before, but one, alas, with deplorable table manners. The second section, however, is the funniest:

In the days before the war I had always been modestly proud of being an Englishman. . . . But some of these Britons here who cannot speak a word of English make one doubtful. . . .

The fact is, if you throw a dragnet over France, Poland, Norway, Belgium, and Holland, scooping in everything with a British identity card, you get an odd catch. . . . I am pretty sure that several of us are baboons, and it is here I feel that a line should be drawn. The authorities ought to release at least anything that goes on all fours.

A trained body of men like the Gestapo could easily weed out the doubtful cases. If an internee has a tail, he should be given his freedom.

The Germans seem to have agreed with Wodehouse; they gave him the freedom of the country and a room in the Hotel Adlon in Berlin. They let him broadcast to the United States and even allowed him to reveal his tale to the *Saturday Evening Post*.

FRANK LUTHER MOTT'S "American Journalism: the History of Newspapers in the United States Through 250 Years, 1690 to 1940" (Macmillan, \$5.50) is the record, in 731 large pages, of the satisfaction—and stimulation—of "the wayne and curious desiere to see newes" which has given us the doubtful distinction of a newsprint culture unparalleled in the civilized world. Professor Mott has performed an extraordinary feat of compilation which covers every period and phase of the development of the American newspaper. Its arrangement, in chronological sections, entails repeated breaks in the continuity and suspense of the

accounts of long-lived journals and journalists, but it is difficult to see how the complete story could have been encompassed otherwise. It is a book of facts, not a critique—the fact, for instance, that the press has become a part of big business emerges clearly from Professor Mott's account; the deeper social implications of that fact do not much concern him. He discusses the freedom of the press only in its limited legal context. But his book will be indispensable to the writers of critiques.

Few laymen will read the book consecutively, as a reviewer must, but opened at any page it provides interesting reading, first because the story of the rise of journalism in America is a continuously fascinating one, and secondly because Professor Mott has managed to cram in so many of the picturesque and leavening details of newspaper-making in every period. Threads of violence and tall humor run through the whole story—the sometimes fatal fisticuffs of fighting editors and the quips with which they flayed each other in the lustier days when libel actions came in dozens. "So and so denies that he murders the truth. He never gets near enough to the truth to do it any bodily harm." The epic of Hearst is here in detail—including his notorious part in the Spanish-American War; and the beginnings and climax of yellow journalism.

It may seem a little ungrateful, but I closed Professor Mott's book with a perverse nostalgia for a four-page sheet of "publick occurrences" devoid of comics, columns, murders, two-column think pieces spun out of one line of fact, and the story in pictures, repeated ad nauseam, of the girl who lost her sweetheart because she was out of Lux. I know of no more depressing sight than a subway train in mid-summer jammed with men and women wallowing in the "private occurrences" of gossip columns, the brutal language of the Peglers and the Johnsons, the foul details of murders and rapes which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be construed as public business. Reports from England indicate that the shortage of paper, among other things, has raised the level of the press there by eliminating that part of newspaper making which consists of transforming pulp into pulp at great expense. The news that the OPM expects a shortage of newsprint here therefore leaves me unalarmed.

One of these reports—by George Orwell in the current *Partisan Review*—has other interesting things to say about the British press in war time. "The tone of the popular press," he writes, "has improved out of recognition during the last year." The papers which used to comprise "the most lowbrow section of the press" have all grown politically serious. "All of them print articles which would have been considered hopelessly above their readers' heads a couple of years ago. . . . Nearly the whole of the press is now 'left' compared with what it was before Dunkirk—even the *Times* mumbles about the need for centralized ownership and greater social equality—and to find any straightforward expression of reactionary opinions, that is, reactionary in the old pre-fascist sense, you now have to go to obscure weekly and

monthly papers, mostly Catholic papers." Mr. Orwell thinks this is partly due to the fact that the decline in the trade in consumption goods has robbed the advertisers of much of their power over editorial policy—the advertisers are out of Lux now. Ultimately, he continues, this will bankrupt the newspapers, "but at the moment they are in an interim period when they are controlled by journalists rather than advertisers."

SERGEI EISENSTEIN'S anti-German film, "Alexander Nevsky," was withdrawn when the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed. But on March 18 of this year, so Leon Dennen informs me, the Soviet press reported that Eisenstein had been given a premium of 100,000 rubles for "Alexander Nevsky," which was again allowed to be shown. The Soviet-Nazi war began on June 21.

MARGARET MARSHALL

"... the Poison They Name"

THE BOYS IN THE BACK ROOM. By Edmund Wilson. The Colt Press. \$2.50.

Set 'em up for the boys in the back room
And give them the poison they name.

"THE strongest literary medicine the West has ever had to take," Edmund Wilson's publishers term this brief book of Notes on California Novelists. And there is no question of the astringency, the penetration, the potency of the poison to which Mr. Wilson sets the boys up. Natural enough, after "a long submergence in the politics and literature of the nineteenth century," that this emergence into the Klieg lights, slightly distorting Mr. Wilson's vision and perspective, should result in a less orderly method, a less logical approach than is customary in his work. For one can't help feeling, after reading this book, that Mr. Wilson the moralist, deeply resentful of the waste of talent, the lack of self-respect and intellectual integrity of "the boys in the back room," has chosen this rather glib title to serve as vehicle for his generalizations on the influence of Hemingway and of Hollywood—only to be confronted by Steinbeck and Storm, who are not fellow-travelers at all and, whatever their limitations as artists, are as morally aware as Mr. Wilson himself.

The book, then, falls into two parts: a discussion of script-writers imported to Hollywood and an analysis of native California novelists. Residence in Hollywood no more makes a man a Californian than residence in England made Henry James an Englishman. Moreover, Hollywood isn't California. It isn't even Los Angeles. And in climate, both actual and intellectual, it is as different from San Francisco as Westport, Connecticut, is from Bangor, Maine, although they both lie in New England. Because of lack of space, therefore, I shall restrict this review to Mr. Wilson's remarks on native Californians, omitting Saroyan, who has publicly refuted Mr. Wilson's criticism, explaining that his work is without benefit of influence, an immaculate conception fertilized by the beam of Narcissus.

That leaves us Steinbeck and Hans Otto Storm, with whom, as Mr. Wilson puts it, "we get into more ambitious writing."

The choice of the word "ambitious" here seems to me invidious. The difference between these men and the Hollywood boys is not a matter of more or less ambition but a question of moral or ethical approach. If the movie novelists "are preeminently the poets of the tabloid murder," they are dealing with death and decay. Life is the subject matter of Steinbeck and Storm, however invalid artistically their treatment of it appears to Mr. Wilson.

"Steinbeck," the blurb informs us, "considers Wilson's study the best interpretation of his novels he has ever read." Mr. Storm, I should imagine, would not feel similarly. For although in concluding his essay on Storm Mr. Wilson admits that "Pity the Tyrant," an earlier book, "belongs to the top layer of this tradition of American story-telling," he disposes of "Count Ten," Storm's latest and longest work, while admitting "it is not uninteresting to read," in a manner hardly calculated to attract the possible reader. If there is in the book "an uncertainty about idiomatic English . . . the proclivity," is not, as Mr. Wilson suggests, for "German locations."

"My first influence," Storm has written, "is Veblen, my second Conrad; that way in importance, the reverse chronologically. For a long time I thought Veblen's carefully fused damnations were, matter of course, the last word in all-purpose style and couldn't understand why they didn't go off when a lesser *dinamitero* tried it."

It is not then, as Mr. Wilson implies, to his German refugee ancestors of '48, but to a Polish sea captain writing in English and a Norwegian farm boy turned social philosopher that Storm owes a few of his defects and some of his virtues.

The Conrad resemblance Mr. Wilson notes, but the Veblen influence he failed to detect, to the regret of the reviewer, who, having known many intellectual radicals but never a left-wing workingman or skilled craftsman, found in "Count Ten" the same sort of clarification of the socially aware worker's relation to his class as she had discovered for herself some twenty years earlier in an undergraduate reading of Veblen's "Theory of the Leisure Class."

In his final chapter Mr. Wilson discusses briefly the tradition of the labor novel in California. "Here the Californians know what they are talking about," he admits, "and they have something arresting to say." He attributes this special knowledge and ability to the long labor strife in California: the McNamaras, Mooney and Billings, the Wobblies and the vigilantes. But take Massachusetts's history of labor violence. Is it any less longstanding or significant? What about the Lawrence strikes, the Boston police strike, Sacco and Vanzetti? Yet the most successful Massachusetts novelist writes chiefly of Boston Brahmins and North Shore eccentrics. It took Upton Sinclair, a Californian, to write the only novel about the Sacco-Vanzetti case.

The reason that labor is the California writer's natural subject is more obvious than Mr. Wilson realizes. With the exception of Frank Norris, these writers—Jack London, Steinbeck, Storm, even Saroyan—have at one time or another been manual laborers. For when a Californian works his way through college he doesn't, as would an Easterner, tutor in summer camps or sell magazine subscriptions. Between terms he becomes an itinerant laborer, a fruit or vegetable picker, a mechanic or an electrician, riding the rails from one job to

another. He may well have been simultaneously an undergraduate and a union member. In a Californian's education there is nothing to cause the relegation of reading and writing to a separate intellectual realm.

Frank Norris, in an essay called *New York as a Literary Center*, published in 1899, wrote, ". . . all this fuss and feathers of 'New York as a literary center' should be for him [the novelist] so many distractions. It is all very well to say, 'Let us keep in touch with the best thought of our line of work.' . . . The best thought is not in New York; and even if it were, the best thought of other men is not so good for you as your own thought, dug out of your own vitals by your own unaided efforts." From a literary forerunner of Steinbeck's this is a provocative answer to Mr. Wilson's contention that the weaknesses of California novelists are due to their remoteness from the East, from New York, where "all the wires of our Western civilization are buzzing and crossing."

Plenty of wires buzz and cross in San Francisco. The Pacific Ocean is not so "void," the California sun so "empty," the rain so "incessant" as Mr. Wilson remembers. Nor, as far as the American novel is concerned, would it matter if they were. Whatever its weather, San Francisco has had for nearly half a century an intellectual climate stimulating to the tradition of novel writing, whether by sailors like Jack London, engineers like Storm, or sublimated biologists like Steinbeck. The Flowering of California may produce less permanently nourishing fruit than did the Flowering of New England, but the quality of neither can be ascribed to the vagaries of their respective climates.

MINA CURTISS

From the Anglo-Saxon

TEN OLD ENGLISH POEMS. Put into Modern English Alliterative Verse by Kemp Malone. The Johns Hopkins Press. \$1.25.

THE impulse to establish new translations of the classics is a sign of a healthy interest in literature; but, to paraphrase Housman, the capacity does not always match the readiness. The risk is especially great when it is a question of translating in one's own tongue from the archaic to the modern; too often the result is only a reduction, dilution, or annihilation of the original values. We have seen this happen, for instance, with Chaucer, and frequently and dreadfully with the King James Version.

The translator must not be pedantic in his affection or affectation for the old; he must be able to distinguish between the essential vigor of modern speech and its frivolous or vulgar fashions. He must have the skill to dissect the anatomy of language and the sense to admire its sinewy ways; he must have an ear, taste, and insight: and the more he has these, the more likely he will be to speculate on the value of letting well enough alone.

Within the modest scope he has set for himself Professor Malone meets the requirements. He has undertaken to give us ten old English poems, from the seventh century to the tenth; "six of the poems are taken from the 'Exeter Book,' the earliest anthology of English poetry." In his prefatory

note Professor Malone says that his modernizations, made as a labor of love, "are now put into print in the hope that they may lead some lovers of poetry to the old poems themselves." All right; but the reader who lets himself be drawn on in this way will find he has set himself a good many hours of study, presumably including registration in a university course or two. At any rate, Professor Malone's versions are worth reading for their own sake. The weight of the language is here, its heft, its nice balance, the original rhythms and characteristic effects, the quadruple beat of the regular line, and its curious longer extension, counterpoint and sprung rhythm considerably antedating the discoveries of Father Hopkins.

These poems of devotion and reflection, of love and battle, are grave and strong with virtues worth our study and assuring our delight. Their force is positive; it would, as a matter of fact, require a master marplot to misrepresent them entirely. Nobody with the least sense could do an entirely bad job in working them over, but the merit of Professor Malone's work is readily apparent if one compares his versions with those made in the "Exeter Book" by Professor Mackie of the University of Capetown. The latter set out, by his own testimony, to avoid not only archaisms but what he called "poetic diction"; the poetic quality and all-around readability of the Malone versions are of much higher excellence. As to accuracy, scholars will have to do the deciding; there seem to be occasional variations in such matters as tense of verbs, gender of pronouns, and sometimes also vocabulary, not mere choice of words.

In what they say, as well as how they say it, these poems are good to have; and not so obsolete either. Listen; take lines like these, from the lament of Deor—

We asked and learned Ermanaric's
wolfishness of thought; wide shires he held
of the Gothic realm; he was grim, that lord!
Many a wight sat bewound in sorrows,
in ween of woe; they wished much to see
that king in his realm overcome and fallen.
That now is gone; this too will go.

ROLFE HUMPHRIES

Refugees into Citizens

TODAY'S REFUGEES, TOMORROW'S CITIZENS: A STORY OF AMERICANIZATION. By Gerhart Saenger. Harper and Brothers. \$3.

THE author, himself a refugee from Germany, is today director of research for the Committee for Selected Social Studies set up by the Sociology Department of Columbia to study the economic effects of immigration. With the assistance of forty students from several New York colleges he has made a thorough study of the "new" immigrants who have entered the United States since 1933, the year Nazism came to full power in Germany. The result of these studies and researches is now published in an illuminating and exciting volume.

There are many essential differences between the immigrants of the periods before and after that fateful year. Prior to 1933 the European *Auswanderer* was lured to America

You may buy

BOOKS

through *The Nation*

At the request of many readers who reside in communities in which no bookshop has been established, *The Nation* offers to deliver any book to your door at the regular publisher's price (postfree) provided payment is received with the order or publisher's price plus postage if sent C.O.D.

Please address your orders to

The Readers' Service Division

The Nation • 55 Fifth Avenue • New York

To keep abreast of HISTORY in the MAKING

FILL OUT AND MAIL THIS

Order Form

THE NATION • 55 FIFTH AVE. • NEW YORK

In order for me to keep abreast of history in the making, please enter my subscription to *The Nation* for the period indicated below. I inclose \$.....

☐ One Year \$5

☐ Two Years \$8

☐ Three Years \$11

Special Introductory Offer

☐ 13 Weeks \$1

Name.....

Address.....

Foreign and Canadian postage \$1 a year

8-2-41

chiefly by the prospect of material gain; those who have more recently fled from persecution and the wrath of the dictators have stepped down from relatively high social and economic levels. To be sure, every period of persecution in Europe brought similar refugees to America, but before 1933 they came during times of economic and political expansion—it was easy to find a job, often one had not even to look for it. The "new" immigrant on arriving has been greeted, or was until a short time ago, with unemployment figures of more than ten million. How has he behaved in a difficult situation full of cruel and subtle problems? Is there justification for the exclamation of one correspondent in the *Washington News*, "Down with immigration forever!"—based on the charge that refugees take jobs from Americans, who therefore will have to depend on relief?

The author destroys the myth of refugee competition by analyzing the reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the decade between July, 1931, and June, 1940. In this period 528,432 immigrants were admitted, 459,738 aliens departed. That means that in the last ten years the total increase in the alien population by immigration amounts to 68,694. If one considers that in the same period about 800,000 aliens died and more than 1,400,000 became citizens, then the fact emerges that today we have more than two million fewer aliens than in 1931, despite a total population increase of approximately ten million.

The study shows the occupational distribution of various refugee and earlier immigrant groups with convincing statistics and understandable charts and then proceeds to the more difficult task of picturing the psychological situation of the refugee after his arrival: who he was in his homeland, what he becomes here, what he knows about America. The author closes this part of his inquiry with the conclusion that the refugee is faced with a situation here for which he is not prepared. Many a well-meaning American would spare himself disappointment and discouragement if he would understand the full meaning of this simple understatement.

It takes the average refugee about two years to settle and to start the real process of Americanization. No aspect of this process from the "boy meets girl" problem to the economic and cultural contributions of the refugee to America is neglected by the author. Illustrating his findings by many "true stories" of topical interest, he manages to present his material in very readable form without sacrificing its scientific seriousness.

The study is chiefly concerned with refugees in general and makes no differentiation within the group between forced refugees and volunteer refugees—who are rather martyrs of their convictions than victims of racial theories. A special study of the situation of the true political refugees and of the impact of American ideals on their European consciousness—developed mainly in opposition to a feudalism which never existed in the United States—should be of great value and interest. The rich Clipper immigrants who come to continue their appeasers' existence in first-class hotels also deserve some attention, for purely negative reasons. Yet "Today's Refugees, Tomorrow's Citizens" seems destined to be for a long time the general handbook of the latest chapter of immigration. Americans and refugees alike will read it with great profit.

FRANZ HOELLERING

MUSIC

PRESSURE of other matters has kept me from commenting on an article in the *New York Times* last September in which Olin Downes criticized certain practices of the American Federation of Musicians, including its mistaken insistence "on the most . . . that the traffic will bear." This was not the first time: whenever in the past ten or fifteen years the union has argued with the symphony orchestra managements about weekly minimum pay there has been a harumphing by Mr. Downes about the mistaken exaction "of all that the traffic will bear." Nor has it been only about the exactions of performing musicians: commenting a few years ago on the decision of the Philadelphia Orchestra Association not to play contemporary music, Mr. Downes attributed it in part to "the rather grasping attitude of the publishers" who "exact of orchestral associations about as heavy payments as the traffic will bear." Mr. Downes did not say what the extortionate royalties were; trying to imagine, one thought of one or two hundred dollars—the composer's share of which was little enough if one considered how long it had taken him to produce the work and how many performances it was likely to receive. In effect, then, what Mr. Downes contended was this: the orchestra players were to receive a minimum salary of \$80 a week for 29 weeks; the conductor was to get \$70,000 for the season; the newspaper reviewer was to get several thousands a year—to say nothing of the additional thousands for the comments that he broadcast; but the composer, for whom theoretically all this apparatus functioned, was to be very humble. How ignorant and silly Mr. Downes's statement was did not appear until a week or two later, in a reply by Mr. A. Walter Kramer which began with a bow to Mr. Downes's "highly stimulating" and "very able" article and then gave the actual royalty fees for performance: except for a celebrity like Schönberg or Stravinsky the average was \$50, with many works offered at \$25 for a single performance or \$35 for a pair—this, it must be remembered, being shared by the composer and the publisher.

And so in the present instance. Nothing in my present article should be construed as meaning that I regard Mr. Petrillo as an engaging or wholly admirable union president. I disapprove as strongly as Mr. Downes of the union's making it difficult for a conductor to

import from another city a sufficiently competent player whom he cannot find in his own city; and I disapprove of other practices—for example, the treatment of Negro musicians—which Mr. Downes apparently isn't bothered by. But I am aware that the union has secured good conditions of work and pay for its symphony orchestra members; and about this Mr. Downes makes some questionable statements.

The anti-union Boston Symphony trustees maintain that the members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra do not need the union because it would give them no more than they get without it. And Mr. Downes says the same thing: "The Boston Symphony not only gives concerts of finest quality; it also pays a bigger yearly wage, and [though] a somewhat smaller weekly stipend than the best union orchestras." But it is conceivable that if there were no union in other cities to set schedules of pay that must be matched to keep the union away from the Boston Symphony, the Boston trustees would be less generous. And actually they are less generous than they and Mr. Downes contend.

I have obtained the actual 1939-1940 figures—those of the Philadelphia Orchestra from the Philadelphia local of the union, those of the Boston Symphony from a dependable source that I am not at liberty to reveal. The player in the Philadelphia Orchestra who gets the minimum earned \$80 a week for the 32 weeks of the main season; he earned \$80 a week (plus a \$7.25 per diem allowance) for the two weeks of the post-season tour; he was probably one of the 90 men who earned \$60 a week for the eight weeks of the Robin Hood Dell season. The analogous Boston Symphony player earned \$70 a week for the 30 weeks of the main season; he was probably one of the 90 men who earned \$60 a week for the ten weeks of the "Pops" season; he earned \$70 a week for the three weeks of the Berkshire Festival; and he may or may not have been one of the 50 men who earned \$50 a week for the three weeks of the Charles River Esplanade season. The Philadelphia man worked 42 weeks for \$3,200; the Boston man worked either 43 weeks for \$2,910 or 46 weeks for \$3,060.

To Mr. Downes the Philadelphia man's average weekly income of \$61 may look like something to call indignantly "all that the traffic will bear" (I would give something to hear what the Philadelphia man would call Mr. Downes's income); but instead of lux-

uriating in the ease which this enormous amount brought him he went after additional jobs and teaching to earn even more, and for mere necessities! And as a union man he was in a better position to do this than the Boston Symphony man. For the union's contract with the Philadelphia Orchestra specifies the number and length of rehearsals; and since an extra rehearsal must be paid for there are normally no extra rehearsals, and our man's time is his own to devote to his greedy pursuit of money. But our Boston Symphony man may be called to an extra rehearsal without pay whenever Koussevitzky thinks it is necessary; and this interferes with the man's commitments outside.

Among the extra jobs for orchestra players are broadcasting and recording, which are no longer open to our non-union Boston Symphony man. But in 1939-1940, when the Boston Symphony was still recording, he was paid \$15 for a session of three hours which included a rest-period of twenty minutes (higher-ranking men received \$20; soloists more). And if he had been a union player he would have received—to Mr. Downes's indignation—\$14 for each hour, of which only forty minutes would have been used for recording, the remaining twenty minutes being available, however, for rehearsal.

B. H. HAGGIN

CONTRIBUTORS

NATHANIEL PEFFER, associate professor of international relations at Columbia University, has spent many years investigating the economic and political institutions of China and Japan.

WILL CHASAN is associated with the publicity department of a national labor organization. He wrote on the Decline of Boss Hague in *The Nation* for December 14, 1940.

CHARLES E. NOYES is a staff writer for Editorial Research Reports, a Washington newspaper service.

MINA CURTISS is associate professor of English at Smith College.

ROLFE HUMPHRIES, critic and poet, is the author of a translation of García Lorca's poems.

FRANZ HOELLERING is author of "The Defenders," a novel dealing with the collapse of democracy in Austria.

Letters to the Editors

Why Do We Wait?

Dear Sirs: The most harmful doctrines with which the American spirit has ever been drugged are those asserting that we must not fight until we are attacked and that American men must not be sent away from our shores to fight.

The course of the war has shown the folly of relying on such counsels of cowardice. Of all the countries that have faced Hitler, England alone has fought wherever it could find the enemy, and England alone remains free and fights on. The other countries, which waited for Hitler to bring the war to them, are now Nazi provinces. The Germans' cardinal principle is to fight in any country but their own.

Must we wait until the bombs rain down on New York and San Francisco, or shall we send our forces now to meet Hitler wherever he is vulnerable? Must we wait until the millions of people in the rest of the world who would gladly fight with us have all been conquered? Risking a few American lives now will save hundreds of thousands of American lives later.

CYRUS S. EATON

Cleveland, Ohio, July 21

Farmers Need Leadership

Dear Sirs: Farmers are among the hardest-working people in the world. There is no question that we are not getting enough money for our milk, but we can't expect to get very far without the right kind of leadership. Owen D. Young may or may not be all that is claimed for him. We have no guaranty of the sincerity of purpose of the so-called "plan of unity" worked out at Van Hornesville at a conference of representatives of producer organizations. In accordance with this plan, the Dairy Farmers' Union voted to recess the milk strike pending a petition for a federal hearing on a price increase. But I am suspicious of any "unity" for dairymen sponsored by men on the pay roll of large groups that serve dealer interests while masquerading as "farm" organizations.

The Dairymen's League and the Eastern Milk Producers are certainly no true farm organizations. Most farmers realize that the "bargaining agency" in practice amounts to little more than a combination of these two, and now the main

office of the D. F. U. joins what is commonly known as the stooge crowd. It is to be hoped that the trial of the milk trust in September will bare the relationship of these "farm" organizations to Borden and Sheffield.

Suspicion of the so-called "unity" is further aroused when these organizations and their lawyers stress a demand for a heavy increase in the price of Class 1 (bottled) milk. A report states that 40 per cent of the New York City milk supply now goes for Class 1 use. Further increases in the Class 1 price will reduce this percentage and nullify any benefit. How can we believe in the sincerity of the parties to such a proposal?

Why is there no mention of increasing the price of milk for manufacturing purposes? This so-called "surplus" milk is usually priced so low that the blend price to farmers is dragged down. What is the object of boosting the price of Class 1 so high that more milk will be pushed into the low-priced class? It won't help farmers to let dealers buy an increasingly large amount of our milk at a low price. Investigations show that distributors make exorbitant profits on this "surplus."

Milk consumption is now below minimum health requirements. Military defense will be of little use to a people made unfit because food is priced beyond their ability to buy it. To bring real benefit to the farmer without injury to the health of the people, raise the price of milk for manufactured products and leave the fluid class alone.

RUTH E. HILL

Jamesville, N. Y., July 23

In Defense of Stalin

Dear Sirs: In his Litvinov Answers Stalin (*The Nation* of July 19) Louis Fischer says that "Stalin should have organized a 'common resistance' with England and France." Yet Fischer must know that the rulers of England and France at that time were very reluctant to enter an agreement with Russia for common action against the Nazis. Chamberlain peremptorily rebuffed Stalin at the time, and Daladier was already in the "ethical meshes" of Hitler. Stalin was ready to aid Czechoslovakia, but France and Britain refused to take joint action.

Stalin may have made political and

diplomatic mistakes; he may have been ruthless against his enemies and political opponents in Russia; but he has been consistent in one respect—in studiously avoiding war. His attack on Finland and his absorption of the three Baltic states and Bessarabia, it turns out now, were for the purpose of protecting Russia's borders against just such an attack as Hitler has perpetrated.

Reinhold Niebuhr, in the same issue, says in reference to the same matter: "The Nazi-Soviet pact was partly prompted and justified by military necessity, and the mistakes of the democratic world contributed to the situation which seemed to make the pact necessary. . . . In so far as the Nazi-Soviet pact was prompted by military necessity it was not without logical justification from the standpoint of the Russian state."

Thus Niebuhr successfully checkmates Fischer in this matter. As to which is the more astute and philosophic thinker and writer I have my own opinion.

AUG. RUDY

Cleveland, Ohio, July 23

We Want Good Olive Oil!

Dear Sirs: With the foreign sources of olive oil closed, California olive growers are in position to render themselves and the nation a great service if they see to it that their products are handled honestly. It is astounding, therefore, to learn that Milton P. Duffy, State Food and Drug Inspector, has had a bill introduced in the California Legislature to reduce from \$500 to \$25 the fine for adulterating olive oil without informing the consumer of the adulteration.

If passed, this bill will be a setback to the good repute of nearly all California products throughout the country. It will encourage adulteration and consumer deception and thereby affect not only Californians but consumers all over the nation. Californians and others should protest vehemently against such a travesty of public-health administration.

HARVEY LEBRUN

Chapel Hill, N. C., July 19

INFORMATION FOR SUBSCRIBERS

THE NATION, 55 Fifth Ave., New York. Price 15 cents a copy. By subscription—Domestic: One year \$5; Two years \$8; Three years \$11. Additional Postage per year: Foreign, \$1; Canadian, \$1. The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Index to Labor Articles, Public Affairs Information Service, Dramatic Index. Two weeks' notice and the old address as well as the new are required for change of address.

A M
VOL
IN
THE
EDI
"In
Ca
Co
ART
Lo
Oir
Bri
My
Co
Hi
In
A
BOO
Pul
Pri
An
Bu
Pro
Tra
Tec
In
Re
LET
Man
ROBE

Publ
55 Fift
ber 18,
8, 1875

ON

been
oliti-
been
ously
d and
states
were
ssia's
ck as

issue,
atter;
partly
neces-
ocratic
which
...
t was
t was
om the

imates
ich is
hinker
n.
EDY

Oil!

rces of
rowers
es and
see to
d hon-
ore, to
e Food
bill in-
ature to
ine for
orming

n.
setback
ll Cali-
country,
nd con-
fect not
all over
others
st such
ministra-
BRUN

ERS

ork. Price
esties: One
\$11. Addi-
Canadian,
Guide to
rest, Index
information
notice and
e required

A M

VOLU

IN

THE

EDIT

"In

Call

Con

ARTI

Lone

Oil

Brita

My

Con

Hitle

In th

A N

BOOK

Publ

Prim

Ame

Buil

Prose

Trac

Tech

In B

Reco

LETT

Manag

ROBERT

Publiah
55 Fifth
ber 13,
8, 1879